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In one of the most anticipated decisions of the 2017–18 Supreme
Court Term, the Court was asked to decide whether a Colorado
baker’s First Amendment rights must yield to a generally applicable
state law prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation.1
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission arose
from a baker’s refusal to create a wedding cake for a same-sex couple
who were planning to wed legally in Massachusetts and host a
reception afterwards in Denver.2 Jack Phillips, the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop, is a devout Christian who holds a sincere belief that
“God’s intention for marriage . . . is that it is and should be the
union of one man and one woman.”3 As a result of this firmly held
conviction, Phillips will not use his baking and decorating talents to
create wedding cakes for same-sex couples; but he will make and sell
other types of cakes and baked goods to gay and lesbian individuals
and couples.4 As such, Phillips informed Charlie Craig and David
Mullins of this limitation when they entered his shop in the summer
of 2012 and inquired about a cake for their upcoming wedding.5
Thereafter, Craig and Mullins filed a claim with the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission alleging that Phillips discriminated against them on
the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act.6 The Commission and the Colorado Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the couple,7 and Phillips was ordered to
provide custom wedding cakes to same-sex couples, comprehensive
training on the public accommodations act to his staff, as well as
fulfill other remedial measures.8
To Phillips, the creation of a custom wedding cake is an expressive endeavor intended to celebrate the couple and their union.9
Phillips argued that the Commission’s order, which compelled him to
exercise his artistic talents to express a message with which he

1 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–
24 (2018).
2 Id. at 1724.

Id.
Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 1723.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 1726.
9 Id. at 1728.
3

4
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disagreed, violated his free speech right.10 The Court noted that Phillips’
dilemma was particularly understandable given the fact that, at the
time, Colorado did not recognize the validity of same-sex marriage,11
and allowed some storekeepers to decline to create specific messages
they considered offensive.12 In the end, this case presented the Justices
with the question of whether Colorado’s use of its public accommodation law to compel Phillips to engage in expressive pursuits that
conflicted with his religious beliefs violated the First Amendment.13
Instead of addressing the question head on, the Justices resolved
the case by examining the manner in which the Commission treated
Phillips’ religious objection.14 The Court ruled that the Commission
violated the free exercise clause of the First Amendment by showing
“elements of a clear and impermissible hostility” toward Phillips’ religious viewpoint.15 Phillips, the Court said, was entitled to a “neutral
and respectful consideration” of his objections,16 but instead was confronted by commissioners who, during formal public hearings, “endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried
into the public sphere or the commercial domain.”17 In addition, the
Court noted the disparate treatment between the Phillips case and
the cases of other bakers who refused to create cakes with language
and images disapproving same-sex marriage on religious grounds.18 In
these cases, the Colorado Civil Rights Division found no violation of
the State’s anti-discrimination law because “each bakery was willing to
sell other products . . . depicting Christian themes [] to the prospective
customers.”19 Here, the Court said, “the Commission dismissed Phillips’
willingness to sell [other cakes and baked goods]” to Craig and Mullen.20
Moreover, the Commission ruled against Phillips based on the theory
that any message conveyed by the wedding cake would be attributed

Id.
Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
10

11

at 1726.
at 1728.
at 1726–27.
at 1732.
at 1729.

at 1730–31.
at 1730.
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to the couple and not the baker.21 This same line of reasoning,
however, was not extended to the bakers who refused to adorn a
cake with symbolism and text disapproving of same-sex unions.22 Based
on these findings, the Court reversed the lower court’s judgment and
effectively ruled for Phillips.23
The Court noted that Masterpiece Cakeshop presented difficult
questions as to the “proper reconciliation” of two foundational Constitutional principles—equal rights, as expressed in the “rights and dignity
of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but [] face discrimination when they seek goods or services,” against the “right of all
persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment.”24 While the Court recognized Phillips’ free speech claim, it left
undecided whether his conduct was protected expression.25 The Court
indicated that it “must await further elaboration in the courts” to
determine the issue of protected expression.26 Further elaboration by
the Supreme Court was set to occur in the 2018–19 Term with the
case State v. Arlene’s Flowers.27 Arlene’s Flowers involved a similar
factual pattern as the Masterpiece Cakeshop case, but, instead of a
wedding cake, the owner of Arlene’s, Barronelle Stutzman, refused to
create floral arrangements for a same-sex wedding ceremony.28 Like
Phillips, Stutzman contended that her floral arrangements constituted
protected speech because they involved “artistic decisions.”29 The Washington Supreme Court addressed that contention and ruled that the
arrangements did not meet the constitutional standard for expressive
conduct.30 After handing down Masterpiece Cakeshop in June, the
Supreme Court vacated and remanded Arlene’s Flowers, requesting the
Washington court to reexamine its ruling in light of the Masterpiece
Cakeshop decision.31

Id.
Id.
23 Id. at 1732.
24 Id. at 1723.
25 Id. at 1732.
26 Id.
21

22

389 P.3d 543 (Wash. 2017), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
Id. at 549.
29 Id. at 556.
30 Id. at 557.
31 Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 2671, 2671 (2018).
27
28
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Given the Court’s action in Arlene’s Flowers, it remains unclear
exactly how the Supreme Court would have ruled on the central
question in Masterpiece Cakeshop without a finding of religious hostility by the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. That said, it is clear
that this issue will most likely return to the Court as similar cases
have begun to bubble up around the country in state courts.32 At
the same time, those cases will confront the strong record of support
for individual free speech interests that the Roberts Court has developed,33 especially in cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop, where collective
interests reflected through regulatory law conflict with individual
expressive rights.34 This paper examines those competing interests in
light of the Court’s active First Amendment jurisprudence and argues
that the expansive view of the First Amendment, crafted largely by
the conservative majority, is reshaping the analysis of free speech
rights in a manner that largely accommodates Phillips’ claim against
the Colorado Commission. The result would strike down the mandate
requiring the baker to provide custom wedding cakes to same-sex
couples as violative of Phillips’ First Amendment right to freedom of
expression.

32 See Amy Howe, Masterpiece Cakeshop Question Returns to the Supreme Court,
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 22, 2018, 12:59 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/10/masterpiececakeshop-question-returns-to-the-supreme-court/; Nathan Heffel, The 3 Court Cases That
Could Pick Up Where Masterpiece Cakeshop Left Off, COLO. PUB. RADIO (June 6, 2018),
http://www.cpr.org/news/story/the-3-court-cases-that-could-pick-up-where-masterpiececakeshop-left-off; Brennan Suen, Masterpiece Cakeshop Was Just the Beginning, MEDIA
MATTERS
FOR
A M.
(June
5,
2018,
1:32
PM),
https://www.mediamatters.org/blog/2018/06/05/Masterpiece-Cakeshop-was-just-the-beginning-ADF-is-pushing-severalother-license-to-discri/220381.
33 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment in the Era of President Trump,
94 DENV. L. REV. 553, 554 (2017); Joel M. Gora, In the Business of Free Speech: The
Roberts Court and Citizens United, in BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT 227, 255–56
(Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016); Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Chief Justice Roberts is Reshaping
the First Amendment, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 20, 2018, 5:58 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/chief-justice-roberts-is-reshaping-the-first-amendment/.
34 See, e.g., Sorrel v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011) (holding that a state
statute that prohibited the marketing of prescriber information violated the First Amendment); Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2486 (2018) (overturning Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) as inconsistent with standard First Amendment
principles); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2378 (2018)
(holding that a license notice likely violates the First Amendment).
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I. THE ROBERTS COURT

AND

FREEDOM

[VOL. 12:1
OF

SPEECH

When Chief Justice Roberts was appointed to the Court,35 he
inherited a body of free speech precedent built largely on the concept
of an “ideas” marketplace.36 Under this concept, ideas naturally collide
and foster debate37 that challenges traditional ways of thinking and
encourages new attitudes, which are wiser than those generated in
an environment where speech is restricted.38 While the debate this
process produces has become highly valued for the collective benefits
it bestows on society,39 it is fueled by a limitless supply of individual
viewpoints and expressive activity.40 The fortification of that supply,
through the preservation of an individual’s right to fully and freely
participate in the public debate, is vastly important to the Roberts
Court and largely serves as the lens through which the Court analyzes
First Amendment claims.41 This lens has allowed the Court to significantly expand the free speech rights of individuals, especially in areas
such as campaign finance42 and mandatory agency fees,43 where precedent has been read to limit that right. In these areas, the Court has
overturned key precedential cases that favored collective interests over
the freedom of the individual.44 According to Chief Justice Roberts,
the central purpose of the First Amendment is to afford individuals
protection against the majority’s will, as reflected in a law.45 While
this protection is essential to democracy and the achievement of many
other important ends, all of these interests are undermined whenever
the state “prevents individuals from saying what they think . . . or
compels them to voice ideas with which they disagree.”46 For the
35 Roberts was appointed in September 2005. Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
36 See, e.g., Nancy J. Whitmore, Facing the Fear: A Free Market Approach for Economic
Expression, 17 COMM. L. & POL’Y 21, 24–26 (2012).
37 Id. at 26.
38 Id. at 29–30.
39 Id. at 30.
40 Id. at 27, 30.
41 See infra text accompanying notes 42–49.
42 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
43 See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
44 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990)); Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486 (overruling Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
45 McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 205–06 (2014) (plurality opinion).
46 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464.

WHITMORE RTP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

EXTENDING THE ROBERTS COURT’S AFFIRMATION

5/2/20 11:18 AM

111

Roberts Court, individual free speech rights are the foundation upon
which First Amendment law is built.47 These rights serve as the
linchpin of free speech protection and exist regardless of how useful
the particular expression is to the democratic process,48 or whether
the individual is a lone pamphleteer, or some entity that “spends
`substantial amounts of money in order to communicate . . . ideas
through sophisticated’ means.”49
The approach to First Amendment jurisprudence embraced by
the Roberts Court calls to mind the Court’s reasoning in Cohen v.
California, a case involving a man who was criminally convicted for
wearing a jacket that visibly displayed the words “Fuck the Draft.”50
In Cohen, the State argued Cohen’s arrest and subsequent conviction
for disturbing the peace was justified to “protect sensitive [viewers]
from [an] otherwise unavoidable exposure to [Cohen’s] crude form of
protest.”51 In its ruling, the Court rejected the State’s argument, contending that the State had “no right to cleanse public debate” to
accommodate the “most squeamish among us.”52 The opinion signaled
that public discussion will include distasteful views that may well sow
discord among individuals.53 Disagreement, and even offensive utterances, the Court said, are “necessary side effects of the broader
enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to
achieve.”54 According to the Court, the First Amendment was designed
to perpetuate the achievement of these values by the restraints it

47 See, e.g., id. at 2463 (ruling that “[c]ompelling individuals to mouth support for views
they find objectionable violates” a foundational First Amendment principle); Nat’l Inst. of
Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018) (arguing that a disclosure
notice requirement for clinics that provide family planning and pregnancy related services
unconstitutionally compels individuals to speak a particular message); McCutcheon, 572 U.S.
at 206 (plurality opinion) (holding that “[t]he whole point of the First Amendment is to
afford individuals protection against infringements.”). See also Sorrell v. IMS, 564 U.S. 552,
580 (2011) (recognizing that an individual’s right to speak is implicated when government
regulates the commercial use of medical information by data miners and pharmaceutical
manufacturers).
48 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 206 (plurality opinion).
49 Id. at 203 (quoting FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
493 (1985)).
50 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
51 Id. at 21.
52 Id. at 25.
53 See id. at 24–25.
54

Id.
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places on governmental interference in the arena of public discussion.55
These restraints, the Court said, place the “decision as to what views
shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us.”56 Because the
Court recognized the right of individuals to decide the form, content,
and emotive intent of their expression, Cohen’s use of the four-letter
expletive was protected even though others found its use immoral.57
The Court stated that “no other approach would comport with the
premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political
system rests.”58
The First Amendment doctrine applied in Cohen was largely
developed by liberals who wanted to expand free speech protection
for unpopular individuals and groups.59 Cases brought against governmental attempts to restrict union picketing,60 anti-Vietnam War protests
by students,61 flag-burning,62 and Nazi protests63 helped to “establish
free speech as an essential protection for people with minority opinions
who were in danger of being silenced by the majority.”64 While this
doctrine was developed decades prior to Roberts’ tenure, a study
prepared for the New York Times found his Court is now using the
doctrine to champion conservative speech at a far greater rate than

Id. at 24.
Id.
57 See id. at 24, 26.
58 Id. at 24.
59 Adam Liptak, How Conservatives Weaponized the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (June
55

56

30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/us/politics/first-amendment-conservatives-supreme-court.html.
60 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (holding the Constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed the liberty to disseminate information
concerning a labor dispute, overcoming the insufficiently serious or imminent dangers of
breach of the peace or injury to a business interest which the State sought to protect).
61 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that students’
wearing of black armbands were “closely akin to pure speech” and therefore entitled to
protection under the First Amendment).
62 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the flag burning constituted
symbolic political expression, and was, therefore, constitutionally protected).
63 Nat’l Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (holding that the
Illinois courts’ refusal to allow a stay of injunction against a planned Nazi demonstration
effectively imposed a restraint on free speech), aff’d in part on remand, 373 N.E.2d 21
(Ill. 1978).
64 Thomson-DeVeaux, supra note 33.
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liberal speech.65 From 2005 to 2018, sixty-nine percent of the conservative speech cases heard by the Roberts Court received a favorable
ruling, compared to a win rate of twenty-one percent for cases
involving liberal speech.66 This gap is striking when compared to other
Courts, beginning with the Warren Court in 1953. Even the Burger
Court,67 which had the second largest gap between rulings on conservative versus liberal speech cases, produced a liberal speech win
rate of forty-seven percent—more than double the current Court’s—
and a conservative success rate of seventy percent, just one point
higher than the current Court’s.68 These findings compared favorably
to the percent of conservative speech cases accepted for review by
the Roberts Court.69 Of all the free speech petitions accepted by the
current Court, sixty-five percent involved the suppression of conservative expression.70 By comparison, the next highest rate of acceptance
for conservative speech cases was that of the Rehnquist Court at
forty-seven percent.71
Armed with this traditional individual rights approach, the Roberts Court has stuck down restraints on the creation of videos depicting animal cruelty;72 the sale of violent video games to minors;73

65 Liptak, supra note 59; see also Lee Epstein et al., 6+ Decades of Freedom of Expression
in the U.S. Supreme Court 1, 1 (June 30, 2018), http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/FreedomO-

fExpression.pdf.
66 Liptak, supra note 59.
67 The Burger Court succeeded the Warren Court in 1969 and lasted through 1986. See
Epstein et al., supra note 65, at 3 for a table of Chief Justice Terms.
68 See Figure 7a of id. at 13 for win rates.
69 Id. at 9.
70 Id. at 9–10.
71 Id. at 10.
72 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (holding that 18 U.S.C. £ 48 limiting
video depictions of extreme animal cruelty is substantially overbroad and therefore invalid
under the First Amendment).
73 See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011) (holding that video games
qualify for First Amendment protection).
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falsely claiming the Medal of Honor award;74 access to social networking sites by sex offenders;75 hateful protests at military funerals;76 and
corporate spending limits in candidate elections.77 In doing so, the
Court has declined to consider the value of the expression at issue
against its societal costs.78 In a particularly gut-wrenching free speech
case involving the Westboro Baptist Church, an organization known
for picketing military funerals with antigay placards,79 Chief Justice
Roberts recognized both the extreme distress speech can inflict on
others and the shackles the First Amendment places on government
action against such speech. “Speech,” Roberts wrote, “is power. It can
stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow,
and—as it did here—inflict great pain.”80 But even in light of great
agony, Roberts continued, the First Amendment does not allow us to
respond by punishing the speaker.81 “As a Nation,” he said, “we have
chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public
issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate.”82
By siding with speech interests in these high-profile rulings
involving hateful expression, the Roberts Court has earned a reputation
for dramatically expanding the reach of the First Amendment83
through an approach that, according to Professor Burt Neuborne,84
See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709 (2012) (holding that the Stolen Valor Act
constituted a content-based restriction on free speech in violation of the First Amendment).
75 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) (holding that a North Carolina
statute prohibiting sex offenders from accessing social networking websites violated the
First Amendment).
76 See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (holding that hurtful speech on public issues,
such as picketers protesting near a funeral military service, is protected under the First
Amendment).
77 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that a federal statute barring
independent corporate expenditures for electioneering communications violated the First
Amendment).
78 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
79 Snyder, 562 U.S. at 448.
80 Id. at 460–61.
81 Id. at 461.
74

82
83

Id.
See Laurence Tribe, Free Speech and the Roberts Court: Uncertain Protections, WASH.

POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 3, 2014, 8:46 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/03/free-speech-and-the-roberts-court-uncertain-protections/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fb9f46fadb32.
84 Professor of Civil Liberties at New York University School of Law, founding Legal
Director of Brennan Center for Justice, and National Legal Director of the ACLU from
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seeks to “get the government out of the business of meddling with
speech.”85 With an apparent aim of expanding the supply of ideas
and voices in the marketplace, the Court is reshaping the First
Amendment in ways that some worry will end up “creating a doctrine
that simply doesn’t cohere.” 86 Others, however, praise the Court for
its commitment to free speech principles in tough cases87 involving
the types of unpopular and distasteful speech that require the most
First Amendment protection.88 “On [this] score,” Floyd Abrams said, “no
prior Supreme Court has been [more] protective.”89
The Roberts Court’s protective stance toward repugnant messages
and ideas rests on the idea that the Constitution forecloses any
attempt to restrict speech simply on the basis that the expression lacks
societal value.90 This line of thinking was most notable in a case
involving the criminalization of the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty in which a “living animal is
intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed.”91 In
United States v. Stevens, the government argued that such depictions
of animal cruelty should be treated as a new category of unprotected
speech.92 The Roberts Court firmly rejected the idea. “[A]s a general
matter,” the Court said, “the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content.”93 The fact that the government was
arguing for a “free floating test” extending First Amendment protection “to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of

1981–86. Burt Neuborne, NYU L.: FAC., http://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.biography&personid=20165 (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
85 Thomson-DeVeaux, supra note 33.
86 Tribe, supra note 83.
87 Michael W. McConnell, A Free Speech Year at the Court: A Survey of the Supreme
Court’s 2010 Decisions, FIRST THINGS (Oct. 2011), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2011/10/afree-speech-year-at-the-court.
88 Tribe, supra note 83.
89 Id. (Floyd Abrams is a nationally recognized attorney who has litigated countless First
Amendment cases, including high profile cases before the Supreme Court. Floyd Abrams,
CAHILL GORDAN & REINDEL LLP, https://www.cahill.com/professionals/floyd-abrams (last visited Nov. 18, 2019)).
90 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010).
91 Id. at 464–65 (quoting 18 U.S.C. £ 48(c)(1)).
92 Id. at 469.
93 Id. at 468 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)) (internal quotes
omitted).
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[their] relative social costs and benefits” was “startling and dangerous.”94
“The First Amendment itself,” the Court said, “reflects a judgment by
the American people that the benefits of its restriction on government
outweigh the costs” and prohibits any attempts to “revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.”95

II. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

AND

REGULATORY POLICY

The Roberts Court has extended its speech-protective stance to
economic regulatory policy aimed at corporate, professional, and commercial speech.96 The Court most notably started down this path with
its 2010 ruling in Citizens United v. FEC.97 In that ruling, the Court
effectively prohibited the suppression of free speech rights based on
a speaker’s wealth, or the correlation between the public’s support for
an idea and the amount of money used to express it.98 The Citizens
United ruling, which allows corporations to spend unlimited amounts
of money on elections, reiterated a key holding in First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti99—that “political speech does not lose its First
Amendment protection `simply because its source is a corporation.’”100
Following the Citizens United decision, the Court focused its individual
rights argument on regulatory policies which inhibit or compel an
organization’s expressive activities.101 The Court’s approach strengthened
the free speech rights of corporations and other business entities while
broadening what it deemed content-based restrictions to include subject, topic, and speaker-based regulations.102 The Court has also extended a heightened scrutiny review to regulations that burden speech
in pursuit of collective policy aims.103
Members of the Court employed this approach (as well as
longstanding constitutional principles that prohibit the restriction of
offensive speech) to strike down a clause in federal trademark law

Id. at 470.
Id.
96 See infra text accompanying notes 97–195.

94

95

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Id. at 351.
99 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
100 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 342 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784).
101 See infra text accompanying notes 104–67.
102 See infra text accompanying notes 104–67.
103 See infra text accompanying notes 104–67.
97
98
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that prohibited the registration of marks that disparage members of
a racial or ethnic group.104 That case, Matal v. Tam, is significant in
part because the government has long maintained greater power to
regulate expression connected to business and commercial activities.105
The inherent profit motive in commercial information has largely
prevented it from receiving the same degree of First Amendment
protection afforded to non-commercial speech.106 Preceding courts have
partly based this standard on the idea that profit-driven speech is
hardier than other classes of non-commercial speech.107 Since commercial speakers are economically motived to engage in speech, they are
deemed more able to withstand regulatory restrictions than other
speakers.108 Consequently, past courts gave the government more leeway
in regulating commercial speech.109 In doing so, restrictions on commercial speech were subjected to a lower degree of judicial scrutiny
than restrictions on political speech.110 This lower degree of scrutiny
was easier for the government to surmount than the strict scrutiny
that courts apply to content-based regulations of non-commercial
speech.111
Eight members of the Court, writing in two separate opinions,
largely circumvented the lower scrutiny rationale by concluding the
restriction at issue in Matal constituted viewpoint discrimination even
though the government applied the clause equally to marks arrayed
on both sides of every possible issue.112 In a concurring opinion, Justice
Kennedy wrote that “discrimination based on viewpoint, including a
regulation that targets speech for its offensiveness, remains of serious

104 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). At issue in Matal v. Tam was the denial of an
application for federal trademark registration of a dance-rock band’s name, “The Slants.”
Id. at 1751. While the Patent and Trademark Office found that the word “slants” is a
derogatory term for person of Asian descent, the band’s members wanted to use the slur
as the name of their group in an attempt to reclaim the word and drain it of its
denigrating force. Id.
105 See, e.g., Whitmore, supra note 36, at 39–45.
106 Id. at 39.

Id.
Id.
109 See id. at 40–45.
110 See id. at 41.
111 Id. at 47.
107
108

112 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017) (plurality opinion); id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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concern in commercial context.”113 He explained that irrespective of
whether the expression at issue in the case was categorized as commercial speech, the statute’s viewpoint-based discrimination invoked
heightened scrutiny.114 A plurality of justices, which included the Chief
Justice, appeared to agree. The plurality explained that the disparagement clause, which “denies registration to any mark that is offensive
to a substantial percentage of the members of any group,” discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.115 “Giving offense,” the plurality said,
“is a viewpoint.”116 Echoing language that evoked Cohen v. California,117
the plurality said that the government does not have a legitimate
interest in preventing offensive speech because such an intention
. . . strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. Speech that demeans
on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any
other similar ground is hateful, but the proudest boast of our free speech
jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express the thought that
we hate.118

While the plurality expressed dissatisfaction with the government’s
attempt to cleanse the commercial marketplace of any expression likely
to offend,119 it stopped short of resolving the dispute between the
parties of whether trademarks are commercial speech, and thus reviewable under the more relaxed scrutiny standard outlined in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.120 Instead,
the plurality argued that the disparagement clause was far too broad
to “withstand even Central Hudson review,” which holds that the
restriction must be narrowly drawn to further a substantial government interest.121 In Matal, the government analogized disparaging trademarks to discriminatory conduct.122 Since such conduct has an adverse
effect on commerce, the government argued that the clause was
needed to protect the orderly flow of commerce.123 The plurality
Id. at 1767 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.
115 Id. at 1763 (plurality opinion).
116 Id.
113

114

403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971).
Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1764 (plurality opinion).
119 Id. at 1765.
120 Id. at 1764 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S.
557, 564–65 (1980)).
117
118

Id.
Id.
123 Id.
121

122
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found the government’s attempt to drive out discriminatory trademarks
far too expansive as the clause targeted any mark disparaging a
person, group, or institution.124 The plurality labeled the disparagement
clause of the Trademark Act a “happy-talk clause” and warned that
free speech would be endangered if a commercial label permitted
“suppression of any speech that may lead to political or social `volatility.’”125
The Roberts Court continued to elevate the level of scrutiny
economic-based policies receive by expanding the definition of contentbased to take into consideration the purpose for which the information
was being used.126 This allowed the Court in Sorrell v. IMS Health to
protect a drug company’s ability to use pharmaceutical prescriber data
for marketing purposes.127 At issue in Sorrell was a state restriction
on the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmaceutical prescription records
for marketing purposes.128 The regulation, which was intended to
protect medical privacy and the integrity of the doctor-patient relationship, targeted records that identified the prescriber.129 Prior to the
enactment of the law, pharmacies sold these records to data companies,
which in turn developed reports on the prescribing practices of doctors
and then sold that information to pharmaceutical manufacturers for
use in their marketing efforts.130
While pharmaceutical manufacturers were prohibited from using
the data for marketing purposes, the information could be provided
to other entities for use in a variety of contexts such as medical
research, law enforcement and compliance efforts, care management,
and prescription drug educational programs.131 The Court concluded
that the statute was content-based because it disfavored information
used for marketing purposes, and therefore held it was also speakerbased because it disfavored pharmaceutical manufacturers and marketers.132 Laws that impose a direct burden on speech, the Court ruled,
require heightened scrutiny even in cases involving commercial or
Id. at 1764–65.
Id. at 1765.
126 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563–65 (2011).
127 Id. at 557.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 572.
130 Id. at 557–58.
131 Id. at 559–60.
132 Id. at 563–64.
124

125
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economically motivated speech.133 The Court reasoned that these speakers were prohibited from conveying information in their possession134
because that information would be used for commercial purposes.135
The Court noted that the speech at issue in Sorrell was no different
than a “great deal of vital expression” that results from an economic
motivation.136 Ultimately, the Court struck down the regulation under
a more relaxed standard of review137 while the dissent upheld the
statute under a similar level of review.138 While the Court did not
define its interpretation of “heightened” scrutiny, its movement away
from a strict two-tiered system (which reserves full First Amendment
protection for political, social, and other noncommercial expression,
and less protection for speech in the marketplace for goods and
services) is viewed by some as a marked expansion of First Amendment protection for commercial speech.139
In its extension of heightened First Amendment scrutiny into
the professional arena, the Court took special aim at regulations that
compelled individuals to convey messages with which they disagreed.140
The first case involved a disclosure regulation requiring California’s
crisis pregnancy centers to post a government-scripted notice, that
informed clients of state-sponsored free or low-cost health and abortion
services.141 The notice also provided the contact information for the
state-run facilities.142 The Ninth Circuit ruled for the government after
applying an intermediate level of scrutiny to the compelled disclosure

Id. at 566.
Id. at 568.
135 Id. at 562.
136 Id. at 567.
137 Id. at 571–72.
138 Id. at 601. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
139 See Rich Samp, Supreme Court’s ‘Sorrell v. IMS Health’ Ruling Gains Traction in the
Federal
Appeals
Courts,
FORBES
(Jan.
21,
2016,
9:00
AM),
133

134

https://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2016/01/21/supreme-courts-sorrell-v-ims-health-ruling-gainstraction-in-the-federal-appeals-courts/#50f5b8817f59.
140 See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018); Janus v.
AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
141 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2368.
142 Id. at 2368, 2371.
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notice, given its determination that the speech at issue was “professional speech.”143 The Roberts Court countered that professional speech
is not a separate category of expression that can be subjected to a
diminished scope of First Amendment protection.144 The Court, it said,
has afforded less protection to professional speech in only two regulatory circumstances: 1) the mandated disclosure of factual, noncontroversial information in the context of commercial speech; and 2)
professional conduct restrictions that incidentally burden speech,145 such
as requiring physicians to obtain informed consent before performing
an abortion.146 The Court said that neither of these types of regulations
were at issue in Becerra.147 Outside of these two contexts, the Court
explained, precedents have applied strict scrutiny to content-based laws
that regulate professional speech.148 In the opinion, the Court stressed
that because professionals and government disagree on many topics,
the government’s desire “to suppress unpopular ideas or information”
does not wane when it is regulating professional speech.149 Government
policies that restrict the content of professional speech pose the same
inherent dangers to the free functioning of the marketplace of ideas
as regulations on nonprofessional speech.150 Moreover, professional
speech as a category is hard to define with precision and could be
read to cover a wide array of individuals, making it ripe for selective
restrictions on expression.151
In the end, the Court found that it did not need to apply strict
scrutiny because the compelled notice requirement could not withstand
an intermediate scrutiny review as the requirement was “wildly underinclusive.”152 California asserted that its interest was to provide lowincome women with information about the state-supported service; but
the notice requirement did not apply to all health providers that

143 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823, 834 (9th Cir. 2016)
(holding that the notice is subject to intermediate scrutiny), rev’d sub nom. Nat’l Inst. of
Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
144 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2371–72.
145 Id. at 2372.
146 Id. at 2373.
147 Id. at 2372.
148 Id. at 2374.
149 See id. at 2374–75 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FEC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).

Id.
Id. at 2375.
152 Id. (quoting Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 802 (2011)).

150

151
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offer family planning or pregnancy-related services to low-income
women.153
In a similar but even more controversial vein, the Court applied
“exacting” scrutiny to a challenge involving mandatory support of
collective bargaining efforts by public-sector employees.154 In Janus v.
AFSCME, a state employee declined to join the union and strongly
objected to the union’s espoused positions in collective bargaining and
related activities.155 Focusing on the employee’s free speech right, the
Court found the required fee payment to the union particularly
onerous because it forced individuals to “mouth support for views
they find objectionable.”156 “Forcing free and independent individuals
to endorse ideas they find objectionable is always demeaning,”157 the
Court said. Here, government employees were compelled to support a
private expressive organization whose speech activities covered important public matters such as the state’s budget problems and issues
related to education, child welfare, healthcare, and minority rights.158
The Court used this reasoning to reconsider and overrule Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education,159 a case that found collective bargaining
activities less violative of free speech rights than other more direct
political activities in which the union engaged.160 The Court applied
exacting scrutiny to the issues raised in Abood and ruled that the
interests for upholding a mandatory fee on non-union employees were
unfounded.161 In Abood, the State asserted that the agency fee arrangement was necessary to maintain “labor peace” and to prevent
Id. at 2375–76.
Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464–65 (2018).
155 Id. at 2461.
156 Id. at 2463–64.
157 Id. at 2464.
158 Id. at 2474–75.
159 431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2448.
160 See id. at 235–36 (noting the difficulty in “drawing lines between collective-bargaining,
for which contributions may be compelled, and ideological activities unrelated to collective
bargaining, for which compulsion is prohibited.”) (emphasis added).
161 In Janus, the Court explained that exacting scrutiny is a less demanding test than
strict scrutiny. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2465. Under exacting scrutiny, the regulation must “serve
a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive” of First Amendment freedoms. Id. (quoting Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 567 U.S.
298, 310 (2012)). Under strict scrutiny, the government also must show that the regulation
serves a compelling interest and the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve the interest.
When applying strict scrutiny, a court may strike down a regulation if there are less
speech-restrictive alternatives available that would achieve the interest essentially as well
153

154
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“free riding” by nonmembers of the union.162 The Janus Court found
that while labor peace is a compelling state interest, it has been
achieved in unions where nonmembers are not required to pay an
agency fee.163 “It is now undeniable,” the Court said, “that `labor peace’
can be achieved `through means significantly less restrictive of [First
Amendment rights]’ than the assessment of agency fees.”164 As for free
riding, the Court ruled that avoiding free riders is not a compelling
interest.165 As a result, the holding in Abood was declared unconstitutional.166 With the precedential decision overruled, the Court held that
the extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment and that Abood erred in concluding otherwise.167

III. THE COLLECTIVE INTEREST APPROACH
In these three professional and commercial speech cases, the
Court’s liberal wing took issue with the application of a heightened
standard of review to regulatory programs.168 In Sorrell, the dissent
noted that the Court had never used the categories of content-based
or speaker-based to justify greater scrutiny of regulatory activities that
affect commercial speech.169 Regulatory programs, the dissent explained,
commonly draw distinctions based on content and the class of the
entities regulated.170 For this reason, a more lenient and deferential
approach was applied to ordinary commercial or regulatory legislation
that affected speech in less direct ways.171 To apply a strict First
Amendment analysis as a matter of course to ordinary economic
programs is unprecedented, the dissenters explained, and threatens to
as the speech restriction. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring
and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1996).
162 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2466 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 224).
163 Id. at 2465–66.
164 Id. at 2466 (quoting Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 648–49 (2014)).

Id.
Id. at 2486.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 2491–92 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,
165

166

138 S. Ct. 2361, 2380 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552,
587–88 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
169 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 588 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor joined the
majority opinion. Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined the dissent.
170 Id. at 589.
171 Id. at 584.

WHITMORE RTP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

The Elon Law Journal

124

5/2/20 11:18 AM

[VOL. 12:1

open a “Pandora’s Box” of litigation against regulatory practices that
“only incidentally affect a commercial message.”172
This argument was echoed in the dissent in National Institute
of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra.173 The four dissenters warned
that the Court’s constitutional approach “threatens to create serious
problems” due to the central role speech plays in human behavior
and the regulation of that behavior.174 While the Court recognized
two exceptions to its broad-based First Amendment analysis,175 the
dissent noted that many ordinary disclosure laws fall outside those
exceptions and that, if taken literally, “every disclosure law could be
considered content-based, for virtually every disclosure law requires
individuals to speak a particular message.”176 This approach, the dissent
noted, could “radically change prior law” by threatening the constitutionality of laws that protect consumers and govern the securities
industry.177 This threat was made more acute, the dissent said, by the
2015 decision Reed v. Town of Gilbert, where the Court expanded
the definition of content-based to include topic or subject-based distinctions in addition to the traditionally defined viewpoint-based discrimination.178 According to the dissent in Becerra, the majority’s broad
content-based test creates an unpredictable First Amendment standard
that courts may use to strike down health and safety warnings as
well as other routine economic and social legislation long thought to
raise little constitutional concern.179
The alarm raised in Becerra was largely replicated in a fourmember dissent that was written by Justice Elena Kagan in Janus v.
AFSCME.180 In the dissent, Kagan accused the Court of “weaponizing”
the First Amendment in order to “pick the winning side in what

Id. at 602.
138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
174 Id. at 2380 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor joined
the dissent.
175 See id. (stating that the majority: (1) excepts laws that “require professionals to disclose
factual, noncontroversial information in their commercial speech, provided that the disclosure relates to the services that the regulated entities provide[,]” and (2) “excepts laws that
regulate professional conduct and only incidentally burden speech.”).
176 Id. (citation omitted).
172
173

177

Id.

135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
179 Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2381 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
180 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
178
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should be . . . an energetic policy debate.”181 Kagan noted that a
healthy debate over workplace governance had ensued for decades,
resulting in splits among state and local governments (and their
constituents) on the value of public-sector unions.182 By stepping into
this debate and using the First Amendment as a “sword” against a
workaday policy,183 Kagan charged the majority with undermining the
democratic process.184 The First Amendment, she said, was not meant
to be used in such an aggressive manner against commonplace regulations that implicate speech activities.185 Since almost all economic and
regulatory policy involves speech, she warned that the Court’s approach
will allow judges to interfere in democratically constructed policy for
a long time to come.186 The majority’s approach, she said, “runs long”
and allows the Justices at every stop to override the will of the
people.187
In many ways, the gulf between the Roberts Court’s conservative
majority and liberal minority stems from the lens through which they
view the First Amendment and its primary role in a democratic
system. In adjudicating challenges to economic and regulatory problems, the liberals contend that collective speech matters because it
forms the public’s opinion which influences elected representatives and
prompts government action.188 The First Amendment, they argue, facilitates and protects this expressive activity so that economic and
regulatory policy reflects the very thoughts, views, ideas, sentiments,
and choices of the citizens engaged in democratic governance.189 The
majority’s application of heightened scrutiny to ordinary social and
economic legislation dilutes these goals190 and prevents the American
people, acting through their state and local officials, from making
important choices about regulatory policy.191 Instead, they contend that
strict scrutiny should be reserved for factual situations where it is
Id. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 2502.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
181

182

McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 236–37 (2014) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 238. See also Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2502 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
190 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2382–83 (2018)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
191 Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2501 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
188
189
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“realistically possible” that “[g]overnment may effectively drive certain
ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”192 While the Roberts Court
recognizes the First Amendment serves important collective interests,
it contends that those interests are undermined and the marketplace
inhibited from reflecting the true sentiments of the American people
when individuals are not allowed to express their beliefs, or are
compelled to voice ideas with which they disagree.193 Moreover, Roberts
has pointed to the fact that laws, which are viewed as reflecting the
collective interest, include legislation that restricts or compels speech.194
The First Amendment, he argued, affords individuals protection against
such laws regardless of whether government is reflecting collective
speech through its legislative endeavor.195

IV. APPLICATION

TO

MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP

Masterpiece Cakeshop challenges both concepts of First Amendment law. Here, Phillips violated Colorado’s public accommodations
law.196 The law regulates the conduct of shopkeepers and other businesses by requiring them to provide equal access to gay persons in
acquiring the same goods and services as offered to other members
of the public.197 In short, the law is an economic and regulatory
policy that reflects the collective interest in equal treatment—but
when applied to Phillips, it required him to use his expressive talents
to create custom wedding cakes for same-sex couples. When Phillips
creates a custom wedding cake, he reportedly works closely with the
couple, “discuss[ing] their preferences, [] personalities, and [] details of
their wedding to ensure that [the] cake reflects the couple who
ordered it.”198 To that end, he sketches out the design on paper,
chooses a color scheme, creates the frosting and decorations, bakes,
sculpts, and delivers the cake to the wedding.199 To Phillips, a custom

Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2238 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring) (internal citations
omitted). Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined the concurrence.
193 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2463–64; Becerra, 138 S. Ct. at 2374–75.
194 McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 205–06 (plurality opinion). The plurality included Justices
Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy and Alito. Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence. Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan dissented.
195 Id. at 206.
196 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).
197 Id. at 1725.
198 Id. at 1742–43 (Thomas, J., concurring).
199 Id. at 1742.
192
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wedding cake is inherently expressive—it communicates that “a wedding has occurred, a marriage has begun, and the couple should be
celebrated.”200 Viewed in this context, the State’s order conflicted with
Phillips’ religious belief that “God’s intention for marriage from the
beginning of history is that it is and should be the union of one
man and one woman,” and forced him to express a message contrary
to that belief through his custom cakes.201
While the Roberts Court has not decided a case factually similar
to Masterpiece Cakeshop, it has extended First Amendment protection
to a variety of economic and regulatory activities to include the
creation and sale of videos depicting animal cruelty;202 registration of
trademarks;203 marketing of prescriber information;204 compelled disclosure of low-cost health services;205 and mandatory payment of union
dues.206 In doing so, the Court affirmed the value of individual
expression stemming from the economic marketplace, noted the vital
role such speech plays in public debate, and highlighted the burden
that regulations place on it.207 Viewing Masterpiece Cakeshop from
this vantage point, it seems safe to conclude that the Court would
seriously consider Phillips’ First Amendment claim. To determine
whether Phillips’ cake designing and baking activities constitute protected speech, the Court would need to examine whether Phillips
intended to convey a particular message with his custom design, and
whether the likelihood is great that those who view it will understand
the message.208 Given the exceptional care Phillips takes with his
custom wedding cakes, it is fairly clear that he intends to construct
an aesthetic message through the design. Whether the Roberts Court
will find that, in the context of a wedding, the likelihood is great
that those who view the cake will understand its expressive message
remains an open question.209 In the opinion, the Court noted that the
200
201

Id. at 1743.
Id. at 1724 (majority opinion).

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
204 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
205 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).
206 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
207 See supra text accompanying notes 96–167.
208 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (discussing the criteria for which
nonverbal activity may become protected expression).
209 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (considering
whether the hosting of military recruiters by law schools was expressive conduct). The
202
203
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free speech aspect of the case is especially challenging because a
likelihood exists that a “few [people] who have seen a beautiful
wedding cake might” view its creation as an exercise of protected
speech.210
The Court’s observation is notable given that a unanimous Court
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston recognized the role the audience plays in the construction of
aesthetic messages.211 There, the Court ruled that the South Boston
Allied War Veterans Council was “speaking” when it approved the
groups that could participate in their parade.212 The speech act rested
on the idea that the Council made some sort of collective point
because each parade unit chosen was “understood to contribute something to a common theme.”213 This collective point was not just
conveyed among the marchers, but it was also communicated to the
spectators, who assigned their own meaning to the parade.214 In this
regard, “the parade’s overall message . . . [arose] from the individual
presentations along the way” and how these expressive presentations
were collectively “perceived by spectators.”215 The viewers, then, provided the meaning and message of the Council’s speech through their
own insights and imagination.216 “Since every participating unit affect[ed] the message conveyed,” and therefore the message received,
the Court reasoned that the state court’s mandated inclusion of the
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston (“GLIB”)
among the parade participants altered the Council’s expressive content.217
The Hurley Court also pointed out that a “succinctly articulable
message is not a condition” for First Amendment protection218 and
that the message excluded from the parade was “not difficult to

Court ruled that the legislation, which tied federal funding to equal access to campus
facilities by military recruiters, regulated conduct—not speech. Id. at 65–66.
210 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018).
211 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
212 Id. at 574–75.
213 Id. at 576.
214 Id. at 568.
215 Id. at 577.
216 RANDALL P. BEZANSON, TOO MUCH FREE SPEECH 139 (2012).
217 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572–73.
218 Id. at 569.
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identify.”219 According to the Court, a unit marching behind a GLIB
banner “would at least bear witness to the fact that some Irish are
gay, lesbian, or bisexual[;]”220 while also suggesting that the Council
agrees that GLIB “have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance”
as the other parade participants.221 The Court noted that the parade’s
organizers may object to these facts and beliefs “or have some other
reason for wishing to keep GLIB’s message out of the parade.”222 This
argument was embraced by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch in a separate concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop.223 Forcing Phillips to make
custom wedding cakes for same-sex marriages, Thomas wrote, requires
him to bear witness to facts and suggestions with which he disagrees.224
First, such a mandate would force him to acknowledge that same-sex
marriage ceremonies are in fact weddings.225 Second, it would suggest
that Phillips espouses the idea that same-sex weddings should be
celebrated.226 Thomas noted that Phillips believes his faith forbids both
of these messages.227
While Justices Thomas and Gorsuch argued that the custom
wedding cake at issue constituted an expressive act,228 Justice Gorsuch,
in a separate concurrence joined by Justice Alito, expressed concern
with how the Commission differentiated between cakes with and
without words when it came to granting First Amendment protection.229 The argument in the latter concurrence harkens back to a
four-member dissent in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, written by
Justice Alito.230 At issue was a law school’s nondiscrimination policy
which allowed student organizations to limit membership to individuals
who agreed with the group’s secular viewpoint, but prohibited religious
groups from excluding members who did not share their convictions.231
Id. at 574.
Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. 574–75.
219

220

223 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1740 (2018)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
224 Id. at 1744.

Id.
Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 1743–44.
229 See id. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
225

226

230
231

561 U.S. 661 (2010).
Id. at 711.
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The Christian Legal Society held the viewpoint that sexual conduct
outside of a marriage between a man and a woman was improper.232
By singling out one category of expressive association for disfavored
treatment, the dissent found that the law school engaged in viewpoint
discrimination.233 Gorsuch expressed a similar argument in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, arguing that the Commission failed to apply the law in a
neutral manner.234 In a case involving William Jack, who attempted
to purchase cakes with messages that disapproved of same-sex marriage
on religious grounds, the Commission allowed the bakers to deny
creating the cakes because the cakes Jack sought were offensive to
their moral convictions.235 The bakers also said that they would provide
religious persons with cakes expressing other ideas.236 While Phillips
made a similar argument,237 the Commission presumed that Phillips
intended to discriminate against a protected class.238 Justice Gorsuch
argued that the Commission must either require actual proof of intent
to discriminate (as in Jack’s case) or presume intent from the knowing
refusal of service to someone in a protected class (as in Phillips’
case).239 “[T]he Commission could have chosen either course,” Gorsuch
wrote.240 “But the one thing it can’t do is apply a more generous
legal test to secular objections than religious ones.”241
In its opinion, the Colorado Court of Appeals viewed the law
differently and rejected Phillips’ free speech argument.242 The court
concluded that the “act of designing and selling a wedding cake to
all customers free of discrimination does not convey a celebratory
message about same-sex weddings likely to be understood by those
who view it.”243 The court reasoned that to the extent the public
infers a message celebrating same-sex marriage from the cake, the
Id. at 727.
Id. at 724.
234 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1736 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
235 Id. at 1735.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 1735–36.
238 Id. at 1736.
239 Id. at 1737.
240 Id.
241 Id. (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 580 U.S. 520, 543–
232
233

44 (1993)).
242 Mullins v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272 (Colo. App. 2015), rev’d sub nom.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1719 (2018).
243 Id. at 286.
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“message is more likely to be attributed to the customer than to
Masterpiece.”244 The court pointed out that because the Cakeshop
charges it customers for baked goods, a reasonable observer would
conclude that the bakery is merely conducting its business in accordance with the state’s public accommodations law.245 In this way, the
Colorado court said Masterpiece Cakeshop differs from Hurley, where
given the expressive nature of a parade, “spectators [are more] likely
[to] attribute each marcher’s message to the parade[‘s] organizers.”246
The question of whether Phillips’ cake designing and baking
activities would be perceived by reasonable observers as signaling
support for same-sex marriage is certainly arguable, but not inconceivable, given the increasing involvement of the business community
in the realm of public debate. Corporations, associations, and businesses
from the powerful to the mom-and-pop have openly taken stances
on divisive social issues such as gun violence, capital punishment,
political ideology, and LGBT rights.247 Dick’s Sporting Goods made
headlines when the company’s CEO, Edward W. Stack, announced
after the school shooting in Parkland, Florida, that the retailer would
no longer sell assault weapons, high-capacity magazines, or guns to
customers under the age of twenty-one.248 Stack also implored elected
officials to enact common sense gun reform and outlined several
specific measures Congress needed to enact.249 The tragedy in Parkland
also prompted a number of companies to cut ties with the National
Rifle Association.250 For instance, Delta and United Airlines, several
national car rental companies, security companies, and the insurer
MetLife all stopped offering discounts and other promotions to NRA
members.251 The First National Bank of Omaha discontinued offering

Id.
Id. at 287.
246 Id.
247 See infra text accompanying notes 248–66.
248 Jena McGregor, Dick’s Sporting Goods Took a Stand on Gun Sales — and Made a
Big Statement, WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2018, 1:04 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on244

245

leadership/wp/2018/03/06/dicks-sporting-goods-took-a-stand-on-gun-sales-and-made-a-big-statement/.
249

Id.

Nathan Bomey, NRA Fallout: See the List of Companies That Cut Discounts for NRA
Members After Parkland, Florida School Shooting, USA TODAY (Feb. 26, 2018, 7:34 PM),
https://usat.ly/2oz1P9n.
250

251

Id.
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its NRA-branded Visa credit card to customers.252 Pharmaceutical giant
Pfizer refused to sell drugs used in lethal injections to state prisons.253
Chipotle terminated its sponsorship of a Boy Scout Jamboree because
the organization’s stance on gay scout leaders conflicted with the
company’s anti-discrimination policy.254 Stephanie Wilkinson, owner of
the Red Hen (a tiny farm-to-table eatery in rural Virginia), asked
President Trump’s Press Secretary, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, to leave
the restaurant after her staff indicated they wanted her to do so.255
Wilkinson based her decision on Sanders’ public defense of an “inhumane and unethical” White House administration.256 “[T]he restaurant,”
she said in a Washington Post interview, “has certain standards that
I feel it has to uphold.”257 For Wilkinson, this feels like the right
moment in the nation’s history for people to take uncomfortable
actions to uphold their morals.258
For some in the business community, upholding the company’s
morals has translated into openly opposing limitations on the equal
rights of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people. Multinational
and national corporations and associations from Apple and Disney to
the NFL and NBA have threatened to move resources, jobs, and
money-making events from states that pass discriminatory measures.259
In Indiana, the state’s passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act resulted in a loss of more than $60 million in future convention

252

Id.

Erik Eckholm, Pfizer Blocks the Use of Its Drugs in Executions, N.Y. TIMES (May 13,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/14/us/pfizer-execution-drugs-lethal-injection.html
(The company said it makes products to “enhance and save lives” and “strongly objects”
to the use of its products in lethal injections.”).
254 Brady Mccombs, Chipotle Pulls Sponsorship of Utah Boy Scout Event, ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(Mar.
19,
2013),
https://news.yahoo.com/chipotle-pulls-sponsorship-utah-boy200321442.html.
255 Avi Selk & Sarah Murray, The Owner of the Red Hen Explains Why She Asked
Sarah Huckabee Sanders to Leave, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018, 5:24 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2018/06/23/why-a-small-town-restaurant-owner-asked-sarahhuckabee-sanders-to-leave-and-would-do-it-again/.
253

Id.
Id.
258 Id.
256
257

259 Jon Schuppe, Corporate Boycotts Become Key Weapon in Gay Rights Fight, NBC
NEWS (Mar. 26, 2016, 7:54 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/corporate-boycottsbecome-key-weapon-gay-rights-fight-n545721.
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business to the city of Indianapolis.260 The Act, which was viewed by
supporters as a way to protect individuals and businesses with a
religious objection to same-sex weddings,261 prompted travel bans from
cities and states along with statements denouncing the measure from
corporations, sports organizations, universities, and the like.262 The economic pressure exerted on the State prompted the legislature to amend
the Act shortly thereafter with language that prohibited the denial
of service based on sexual orientation and gender identity.263 Indiana,
however, is not alone. In 2016, North Carolina made headlines when
its general assembly not only overturned a Charlotte city ordinance
that banned discrimination against LGBT people, but also barred every
city in the state from passing nondiscrimination regulations.264 The
statute set off a fierce nationwide backlash that included boycotts by
businesses, sports leagues, and musicians.265 Charlotte alone lost nearly
$285 million and 1,300 jobs in addition to the cancelation of the 2017
NBA All-Star Game, which was set to be hosted in the city.266
As more businesses take stands on public issues, it raises the
probability that a reasonable observer would infer that Phillips supports same-sex marriage by his involvement in the wedding reception.
Moreover, the decisions discussed here suggest that the Court is developing a track record of acknowledging the speech interests at stake
in commercial activities regulated by economic policy. This acknowledgement underscores the free speech interests of the individual and
the impact regulatory policy has on their freedom to say what they
think or to refrain from voicing ideas with which they disagree.267
Masterpiece Cakeshop fits into this body of law. Here, Phillips’ con-

Andrew Bender, Indiana’s Religious Freedom Act Cost Indianapolis $60 Million in
Revenue, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2016, 2:28 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbender/2016/01/31/indianas-religious-freedom-act-cost-indianapolis-60-million-in-lost-revenue/#68dccc452e2a.
260

Lost

261

Id.

Robert King, The RFRA Backlash in Indiana, INDYSTAR.COM (Apr. 2, 2015, 11:38 AM),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/01/rfra-boycotts-bans-growing-backlash/70810178/.
263 Bender, supra note 260.
264 David A. Graham, Red State, Blue City, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/red-state-blue-city/513857/.
262

266

Id.
Id.

267

Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018).

265
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servative religious viewpoint is being altered to provide anti-discrimination protection for same-sex couples. Viewed through the lens of
the Roberts Court’s decisions, the Commission’s order will most likely
be subjected to a form of strict scrutiny–albeit heightened, exacting
or strict–given that it “draws distinctions based on the message [Phillips] conveys.”268 The fact that the speech occurs in the commercial
realm or constitutes professional speech will not subject it to a lower
level of First Amendment scrutiny.269 The Court has ruled that laws
that impose a direct burden on speech require heightened scrutiny
even in cases involving commercial270 or professional speech.271 Only
laws that mandate disclosure of factual noncontroversial information
in the context of commercial speech or professional conduct regulations that incidentally burden speech are subject to a diminished
scope of First Amendment protection.272 The fact that the expressive
idea at issue may be demeaning or disparaging to a particular group
will also not save it from heightened scrutiny—it will only make the
case against its regulation stronger by implicating the bedrock principle
prohibiting the restriction of speech on the grounds that it offends273
as well as the Court’s ruling that “giving offense is viewpoint.”274 The
same rings true for the fact that the regulation does not prevent the
idea from entering the marketplace, but only compels adherence to a
counter narrative in the marketplace of goods and services.275 The
Court has explained that forced speech is “always demeaning” because
it forces “free and independent individuals to endorse ideas they find
objectionable.”276

V. CONCLUSION
In the end, Masterpiece Cakeshop is perfectly positioned for the
Roberts Court and the conflicting approaches to First Amendment

268 Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S.
552, 566 (2011)).
269 See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2464–65.
270 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 566.
271 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2371 (2018).
272 Id. at 2372.
273 Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017).
274 Id. at 1763.
275 See Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2464 (2018).
276

Id.

WHITMORE RTP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

EXTENDING THE ROBERTS COURT’S AFFIRMATION

5/2/20 11:18 AM

135

analysis between the conservative and liberal wings. Given the conservative majority, it stands to reason that an individual rights approach will win out over the call from the liberal minority for a
First Amendment doctrine that leaves economic and regulatory laws
which reflect the collective interest standing.277 That said, the Court
lost one of its most speech-protective justices when Justice Anthony
Kennedy stepped down at the end of the 2017–18 Term.278 Justice
Brett Kavanaugh took his seat.279 Commentators argue that Kavanaugh’s
“opinions are consistent with the Court’s strong protection of free
speech rights” and make it very likely that Kennedy’s free speech
legacy will survive.280 According to Professor Timothy Zick, Kavanaugh’s record on free speech cases demonstrates a strong support
for the speech rights of corporations.281 In this area, Kavanaugh has
authored opinions on campaign finance282 and telecommunication regulation.283 In the area of campaign finance, he wrote that the First
Amendment protects the “right of citizens to band together[,] . . . pool
their resources,” and spend unlimited amounts of money “to express
their views about policy issues and candidates for public office”284—
a stance in line with the Court’s Citizens United ruling.285
On the telecommunications front, Kavanaugh likened an Internet
service company’s right to control the speed and availability of the
data it distributes to the editorial freedom of media companies.286 In
See, e.g., Reed v. Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Jonathan H. Adler, Judge Kavanaugh and Justice Kennedy’s Free Speech Legacy,
REASON (July 11, 2018, 10:43 PM), https://reason.com/2018/07/11/judge-kavanaugh-and-justicekennedys-fre/.
277
278

279
280

Id.
Id.; Ken White, You’ll Hate This Post on Brett Kavanaugh and Free Speech, POPEHAT

(July 10, 2018), https://www.popehat.com/2018/07/10/youll-hate-this-post-on-brett-kavanaughand-free-speech/.
281 Timothy Zick, Judge Kavanaugh and Freedom of Expression, SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 7,
2018, 3:49 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/08/judge-kavanaugh-and-freedom-of-expression/.
282 See, e.g., Emily’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp.
2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011); Republican Nat’l Comm. v. FEC, 698 F. Supp. 2d. 150 (D.D.C. 2010).
283 See, e.g., United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh,
J., dissenting); Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC v. FCC, 717 F.3d 982 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh,
J., concurring); Cablevision Sys. Corp. v. FCC, 597 F.3d. 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
284 Emily’s List, 581 F.3d at 4.
285 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
286 United States Telecom, 855 F.3d at 430 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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dissent, he argued that the FCC’s net neutrality rule violates the First
Amendment because it restricts the editorial discretion of Internet
service providers.287 Kavanaugh wrote:
Absent a showing of market power[,] . . . the Government may not tell
Internet service providers how to exercise their editorial discretion about
what content to carry or favor any more than the Government can tell
Amazon or Politics & Prose what books to promote; or tell The Washington
Post or the Drudge Report what columns to carry; or tell ESPN or the
NFL Network what games to show.288

Given his posture on regulatory law in the campaign finance
and telecommunications areas, one commentator wrote that Kavanaugh
would likely be viewed as an advocate for using the First Amendment
as a “weapon” to strike down economic and regulatory policy.289
It may not be long before we find out exactly how Justice
Kavanaugh will rule on a case similar to Masterpiece Cakeshop. In
October 2018, the Court was asked to review a case involving an
Oregon couple’s refusal to make a custom wedding cake for a samesex couple.290 The owners of Sweetcakes by Melissa contend that the
application of the State’s public accommodation statute to their custom
wedding cake service compels them to express a celebratory message
of same-sex marriage with which they disagree.291 Given the lens
through which the Robert’s Court views free speech claims, the body
of First Amendment precedent the Court has developed, and the fivemember conservative majority, it is highly likely that Sweetcakes by
Melissa (or some other factually similar case) will confront a Court
that is poised to carve out a free speech exception in public accommodation laws for individuals engaged in expressive commercial activities that contend the law forces them to convey a recognizable
aesthetic message with which they disagree.

Id. at 429.
Id. at 435.
289 White, supra note 280.
290 Howe, supra note 32.
287
288

291 Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051, 1069 (Or. Ct. App. 2017), vacated,
139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (remanding to the Oregon Court of Appeals for further consideration
in light of the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision).

